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THE AUTHORITY TO TAX IN WISCONSIN
JACK STARK*
I. INTRODUCTION
For several reasons it is important to identify precisely the taxing au-
thority bestowed on Wisconsin units of government. Because tax reve-
nue is the lifeblood of governments, all tax questions have some
significance, and the question of the authority to tax is the most funda-
mental of all. Its fundamental nature becomes obvious if one realizes
that successfully challenging the authority of an entity to impose a cer-
tain tax discontinues that tax; whereas, other types of successful litiga-
tion by taxpayers merely reduce or eliminate liability for some persons
who are subject to the tax or otherwise lessen the tax's effect.
The issue of the authority to tax is especially important in times like
the present, when the public's resistance to taxes entices governmental
officials to tax in novel ways, perhaps by going beyond their authority or
shifting to another entity the responsibility for imposing a tax, which, as
explained below, may be done in such a way that it violates one of the
limits on taxing authority. Finally, if a bond issue is to be funded with a
revenue stream that includes a tax that the issuer may not have the au-
thority to impose, bond counsel who are aware of the difficulty will not
approve the issuance and, if the bonds are issued, bond holders may liti-
gate later if they discover the possible abuse of authority.
II. THE STATE'S AUrHORrrY TO TAX
Wisconsin's authority to tax differs substantially from that of local
units of government in the state. The most fundamental taxing authority
of this state is derived from the state constitution. The finance article of
the constitution includes a number of statements that indirectly grant to
the state its taxing authority. For example, one statement requires that
"[t]he legislature shall provide for an annual tax sufficient to defray the
estimated expenses of the state for each year."1 This statement implies
that there is also authority to enforce compliance with the requirement.
An early case held that this edict was "simply intended as a regulation or
* Assistant Chief Counsel, Legislative Reference Bureau of the State of Wisconsin. B.A.
1961, Northland College; M.A. 1963, Claremont Graduate School; Ph.D. 1969, University of
Wisconsin; J.D. 1979, University of Wisconsin.
1. Wis. CONST. art. VIII, § 5.
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provision covering the levying of a direct tax upon property, if such a tax
be necessary."' At the time that was an accurate statement, but since
then the constitution has been amended to allow other taxes as well.3
A second indirect conferral of taxing authority to the state by the
constitution is the requirement that "every ... law [contracting debts]
shall provide for levying an annual tax sufficient to pay the annual inter-
est of such debt and the principal within five years from the passage of
such law."'4 This provision is almost totally irrelevant today because it
appears in a section that authorizes the state to incur a total debt of only
$100,000. Another portion of the constitution states that "[t]he full faith,
credit and taxing power of the state are pledged to the payment of all
public debt created on behalf of the state pursuant to this section."'5 An-
other section requires that "any law which imposes, continues or renews
a tax" must have been passed by the Legislature in a roll-call vote rather
than a voice vote.6 There also is a reference to money "raised by
taxation."'7
All of these statements stop short of actually authorizing a tax. How-
ever, there is a statement that explicitly authorizes a state tax: "Of the
moneys appropriated under the authority of this subsection [for forestry
purposes] in any one year an amount not to exceed two-tenths of one
mill of the taxable property of the state... may be raised by a tax on
property."8 This constitutional provision resulted in the enactment of a
statute that imposes just such a tax;9 this is the only state tax that applies
to all taxable property.
The major constitutional source of the state's taxing authority is the
section that includes the uniformity clause, a portion of which specifies
that "taxes shall be levied upon such property.., as the legislature shall
prescribe."'1 Beginning with the early days of statehood and lasting for
many decades, a broad-based property tax was a major source of state
2. Nunnemacher v. State, 129 Wis. 190, 223, 108 N.W. 627, 637 (1906).
3. WIs. CONST. art. VIII, § 1.
4. Id art. VIII, § 6.
5. Id. art. VIII, § 7(2)(f).
6. Id art. VIII, § 8.
7. Id. art. VIII, § 10(2).
8. Id art. VIII, § 10(3).
9. Wis. STAT. § 70.58 (1991-92).
10. WIS. CONSr. art. VIII, § 1. Occasionally the entire section is called the uniformity
clause. I will distinguish between the statement that taxation shall be uniform (the uniformity
clause in the strict sense) and the section as a whole.
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revenue.'" Now, however, authorization of a broad-based tax merely
duplicates the authorization of a property tax for forestation purposes.' 2
However, the above statement also authorizes a more narrow tax-a
state tax imposed at the statewide average rate on the property of cer-
tain utilities. 3 Utilities that pay this tax are railroads, sleeping car com-
panies, air carriers, pipeline companies, and conservation and regulation
companies (companies that regulate the height and flow of water in res-
ervoirs). Beginning on May 10, 1997, telephone companies will also be
subject to that tax rather than to the current license fee based on gross
receipts.
In 1908 a more significant authorization to tax was added to the sec-
tion of the constitution that contains the uniformity clause. That year
the people of the state ratified an amendment that stated "[t]axes may
also be imposed on incomes, privileges and occupations."' 4 The main
purpose for the amendment was to permit a state income tax, the enact-
ment of which would solve some of the difficulties of the property tax-
especially the difficulty of applying property tax to intangible property.'5
The amendment's most important effect was a great expansion of the
kinds of taxes that the constitution specifically authorizes. No longer did
the state have to depend so heavily on the property tax.
Some statutes explicitly impose taxes on incomes, authorization for
which is clearly derived from the 1908 amendment to the uniformity
clause of the Wisconsin Constitution. These taxes are the individual in-
come tax;' 6 the tax on fiduciaries, which applies to the income of trusts
and estates;' 7 the income tax applicable to partnerships;'8 the corporate
income tax;' 9 the tax on the income of tax-option corporations (which
are referred to as S corporations in the Internal Revenue Code);20 the
11. See Jack Stark, A History of the Property Tax and Property Tax Relief in Wisconsin, in
1991-92 WISCONSiN BLUE BOOK 99 (providing an account of the early broad-based property
tax as well as a general history of the property tax in Wisconsin).
12. WIs. CONST. art. VIII, § 10(3).
13. Wis. STAT. § 76.13(1) (1991-92).
14. WIS. CONsT. art. VIII, § 1.
15. See John 0. Stark, The Establishment of Wisconsin's Income Tax, Wis. MAG. OF HisT.,
Autumn 1987, at 27.
16. Wis. STAT. § 71.02(1) (1991-92).
17. Id. §§ 71.02(1), 71.125.
18. Id. § 71.19 (imposing the tax indirectly by subjecting partnerships to the liabilities of
other entities as set forth in chapter 71).
19. Id. § 71.23.
20. Id. § 71.32. Again the imposition is done indirectly, by making these entities subject
to the liabilities that apply to other entities under chapter 71.
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tax on the income of urban transit companies;21 and the tax on the in-
come of insurers.22
A number of Wisconsin taxes are explicitly imposed in return for
privileges. The franchise tax is imposed on corporations "[f]or the privi-
lege of exercising [their] franchise or doing business in this state in a
corporate capacity."'  Insurers are also subject to a franchise tax
through a statute that is worded similarly to the statute that imposes the
franchise tax on other corporations.24 Virtually every corporation (in-
cluding insurance corporations) which may be subject either to an in-
come tax or a franchise tax is subject to a franchise tax, because such tax
allows the state to tax the income from certain federal securities.
The distinction between the income tax and the franchise tax clearly
indicates the formalism of tax law and the importance that labels often
have in this area of the law. Assuming that "right" is a synonym of
"privilege," as the Wisconsin Supreme Court held in an early case,2s the
forest cropland severance tax is a privilege tax because it is imposed "on
the right to cut and remove wood products."26 The sales tax is imposed
twice, once for goods and once for services, and both imposition statutes
make it clear that the sales tax is a privilege tax. The statute imposing
the tax on goods begins: "[f]or the privilege of selling, leasing or renting
tangible personal property."'27 The statute imposing the tax on services
begins: "[f]or the privilege of selling, performing or furnishing ... serv-
ices."2 The temporary recycling surcharge, which is actually a tax be-
cause it is not regulatory and because for most taxpayers it is a
percentage of their income tax or franchise tax, or is based on amounts
calculated in determining liability for one of those taxes, is imposed
"[flor the privilege of doing business in this state."'29
Although several state taxes have the very narrow base characteristic
of excise taxes, they are imposed as occupational taxes, thereby deriving
their authority from the reference to occupational taxes in the constitu-
21. Id. § 71.37. This imposition is even more indirect than the impositions for partner-
ships and tax-option corporations: "urban transit corporations are subject to this chapter."
22. Id. § 71.43(1).
23. Id. § 71.23(2).
24. Id. § 71.43(2).
25. State ex rel. Froedtert Grain & Malting Co. v. Tax Comm'n, 221 Wis. 225, 230-31,265
N.W. 672, 674 (1936).
26. Wis. STAT. § 77.06(5) (1991-92).
27. Id. § 77.52(1) (emphasis added).
28. Id. § 77.52(2) (emphasis added).
29. Id. § 77.93 (emphasis added).
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tional section that includes the uniformity clause.30 An example is the
fermented malt beverages tax, which is referred to as an occupational tax
in its imposition statute. 1 The same is true of the liquor tax,32 the to-
bacco products tax,33 the bingo gross receipts tax,34 and the tax on con-
trolled substances. 35
Other occupational taxes provide revenue for both the state and local
units of government. Each is specifically identified as an occupational
tax in the imposition statute. These occupational taxes include the min-
ing tax,36 the tax on operating an iron ore concentrates dock,37 the tax on
grain storage,38 the tax on operating a coal dock,39 the tax on refining
petroleum and petroleum products,4° and the tax on owners of domestic
mink.41
If these were the only state taxes, each state tax would be firmly
anchored in Article VIII, section 1, the constitutional section that in-
cludes the uniformity clause. However, there are other state taxes.
Among them are the oil and gas severance tax, which is called a "sever-
ance tax;"'42 the estate tax, which is simply referred to as a "tax;"43 the
license fee for light, heat and power companies, which is called "an an-
nual license fee"'  and which, despite its name, is a tax because it pro-
vides general revenue rather than merely being an imposition under the
police power to fund the costs incurred to regulate the utilities; the "an-
nual license fee" (another tax, for the same reasons) on telephone com-
panies;4 5 the car line tax, which is called "a gross earnings tax; '46 the real
estate transfer "fee"47 (which probably would indeed be a fee if the state
did not receive 80% of the proceeds); the use tax;48 the motor vehicle
30. Wis. CON sT. art. VIII, § 1.
31. Wis. STAT. § 139.02(1).
32. Id § 139.03.
33. I- § 139.76(1).
34. Id § 563.80.
35. Id § 139.88.
36. Id § 70.375(2m).
37. Id § 70.40(1).
38. Id § 70.41(1).
39. Id § 70.42(1).
40. Id § 70.421(1).
41. Id § 70.425(1).
42. Id § 70.397(2).
43. Id § 72.02.
44. Id § 76.28(2)(a).
45. Id § 76.38(4)-(6).
46. Id § 76.39(2).
47. Id § 77.22(1).
48. Id § 77.53(1).
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fuel tax;49 the alternate fuels tax;50 the general aviation fuel tax;"' and
the cigarette tax;52 each of which is called an "excise tax"; the cigarette
inventory tax, which is simply called a "tax";53 and the racing admissions
tax, which has no label. 4 Oddly enough, the cigarette tax was changed
from an occupational tax to an excise tax,55 thereby losing its anchorage
in the constitution, because a United States Supreme Court case pro-
vided that such a change would allow the state to tax certain sales of
cigarettes by American Indians to non-Indians.5 1
However, taxes that do not fit within the categories specified in Arti-
cle VIII, section 1 are in no danger of being invalidated. One way to
defend them is to assert that, despite their labels, each of them can be
characterized as either a privilege tax or an occupational tax. "Privilege
tax" is so broad that it would probably include all of these taxes and
perhaps even include any tax the statutes would authorize. This strategy
runs counter to the formalistic nature of tax law, as illustrated in the
substantive effect of changing the cigarette tax's label. A second and
probably more effective line of defense is to avoid dependence on consti-
tutional authorization and to rely instead on a line of cases. The line of
cases provides an interesting illustration of how a probable misreading of
a vague statement, unsupported by authority, can change that statement
into a more precise legal rule.
The line of cases begins with one in which a means of equalization 57
was at issue. In validating the challenged equalization process, the court
stated that "this whole matter is within the control of the legislature."58
Although the meaning of "this whole matter" is not completely clear, the
most plausible interpretation is that the court was referring to equaliza-
tion, not to every facet of taxation. Twenty years later the meaning of
"this whole matter" changed, and the legislature's power was stated in
49. Id. § 78.01(1).
50. Id. § 78.40(1).
51. Id. § 78.555.
52. Id. § 139.31(1).
53. Id. § 139.315(1).
54. Id. § 562.08.
55. 1983 Wis. Laws 55.
56. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134
(1980).
57. Equalization is an adjustment by the Department of Revenue of property tax assess-
ments made by various units of government so that all assessments are at full market value
and so that, as a result of the adjustment, the taxes imposed by units of government (such as
counties) that extend over several smaller units (such as municipalities) will be fairly appor-
tioned among the smaller units.
58. State ex rel. Brown County v. Myers, 52 Wis. 628, 632, 9 N.W. 777, 778 (1881).
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more sweeping terms when the court, citing the earlier case, wrote that
"the legislature has plenary power over the whole subject of taxation
within constitutional limitations. '59 In six cases that followed, the court
again held that the legislature's authority to tax was bound only by the
state constitution.60 More recently, the court softened its position: "The
courts have recognized that the state legislature has wide latitude to se-
lect the subjects of taxation and to grant exemptions. 61 Thus, despite
the very insubstantial foundation on which these cases are built, there is
considerable precedent for the view that the state government may enact
whatever taxes it pleases as long as it does not violate a constitutional
provision. Failure to denominate a tax as one of the types specified in
the constitution is not a violation of the constitution. It will be evident
later, however, that several non-constitutional limits on the state's au-
thority to tax exist.
III. Tm CONSTrurt oN~A AUTHORY FOR LOCAL TAXEs
There is also constitutional authority for the imposition of local taxes.
Several constitutional provisions recognize the existence of local taxes or
command local units of government to tax. One provision states that
"the legislature may empower cities, villages or towns to collect and re-
turn taxes on real estate located therein by optional methods."62 Pre-
sumably the legislature may also authorize units of government to
impose taxes on real estate; however, this provision does not explicitly
grant them the authority to do so.
Another provision directs counties, cities, towns, villages, school dis-
tricts, sewerage districts, and other municipal corporations to levy a di-
rect annual tax to retire their debt.63 In the constitution a "direct" tax is
a property tax. As noted earlier, Article VIII, section 1 implicitly autho-
rizes a property tax for a specific purpose; it stops short of authorizing a
broad-based property tax or any other kind of tax. Another section di-
rects, and therefore implicitly authorizes, towns and cities to raise a tax
59. State ex reL Ellis v. Thorne, 112 Wis. 81, 85, 87 N.W. 797, 798 (1901).
60. Thompson v. Kenosha County, 64 Wis. 2d 673, 684, 221 N.W.2d 845, 851 (1974); City
of West Allis v. Milwaukee County, 39 Wis. 2d 356,369,159 N.W.2d 36,42 (1968), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 1064 (1969); City of Plymouth v. Eisner, 28 Wis. 2d 102, 106, 135 N.W.2d 799, 801
(1965); State ex reL Thomson v. Giessel, 265 Wis. 207,213,60 N.W.2d 763,766 (1953); Milwau-
kee County v. Dorsen, 208 Wis. 637, 640-41,242 N.W. 515, 516 (1932); State ex reL Hessey v.
Daniels, 143 Wis. 649, 653, 128 N.W. 565, 566 (1910).
61. WKBH Television, Inc. v. Dep't. of Revenue, 75 Wis. 2d 557,566,250 N.W.2d 290,294
(1977).
62. WiS. CONST. art. VIII, § 1.
63. Id. art. XI, § 3(3).
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for the schools equal to at least one-half of the amount that the town or
city receives for school purposes from the income of the school fund.6'
That amount was minuscule in the past and is now nothing because the
income from that fund is presently allocated entirely to libraries.
At first glance, the home rule section of the constitution grants broad
authority, perhaps even taxing authority, to cities and villages. It states
that home rule municipalities "may determine their local affairs... sub-
ject only to this constitution and to such enactments of the legislature of
statewide concern as with uniformity shall affect every city or every vil-
lage."65 However, case law makes it clear that taxation is a matter of
statewide concern. Two cases decided in a rather recent year established
that principle. 66 A later case, which considered the validity of a county
(as opposed to municipal) assessment system, echoed the view of the two
earlier cases by stating, "equality in taxation is a matter of particular
statewide concern."'6 7 An even more recent case stated the corollary of
the holding that taxation is a matter of statewide concern-local units of
government may enact only those taxes that the state government autho-
rizes by legislation.68
Because the authority of local units of government to tax has no sub-
stantial roots in the state constitution, it is necessary to look for statutory
authorization. Before doing so, however, it is worth noting that two stat-
utes prohibit certain taxes: a local income tax69 and a local motor vehicle
fuel tax.70 The case law on the home rule section of the constitution
makes it obvious that local units of government have no inherent taxing
authority and must rely on state authorization; thus, the statutes are re-
dundant. The same effect is attained by the failure to authorize, by stat-
ute, local income taxes and local motor vehicle fuel taxes. Another
statute provides that, notwithstanding the statutory prohibition against
local income taxes, municipalities may impose franchise fees on cable
television companies based on income.
64. Id. art. X, § 4.
65. Id. art. XI, § 3(1).
66. Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 621, 137 N.W.2d 442, 449
(1965), appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 4 (1966); Plymouth v. Eisner, 28 Wis. 2d 102, 107, 135
N.W.2d 799, 802 (1965).
67. Thompson v. Kenosha County, 64 Wis. 2d 673, 686, 221 N.W.2d 845, 852 (1974).
68. Blue Top Motel, Inc. v. City of Stevens Point, 107 Wis. 2d 392, 395, 320 N.W.2d 172,
173 (1982).
69. Wis. STAT. § 66.70 (1991-92).
70. Id. § 78.82.
71. Id. § 66.082(3)(c).
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The number of local taxes authorized by statute in Wisconsin is quite
small, smaller than the number in most other states. One such local tax,
the franchise fee that may be imposed on cable television companies, has
already been mentioned. In actuality it is a tax, not a fee, because it may
be imposed at a rate exceeding the cost of regulation and thus may pro-
duce general revenue for the municipality imposing it, although the au-
thorizing statute mentions that the fee is imposed in the regulation of
those systems. Another statute allows towns, villages, and cities to im-
pose a "room tax," a tax on the furnishing of rooms to transients.72
Counties are allowed to impose sales and use taxes. 73 Municipalities and
counties are also allowed to impose vehicle registration fees (the "wheel
tax").74 Local exposition districts may impose a tax on the rental of ho-
tel and motel rooms,75 a tax on the sale of certain food and beverages, 76
and a tax on car rentals.77
The tax that is available to most local units of government and pro-
vides by far the most local tax revenue is the property tax. Authority to
impose the property tax appears in many statutes. Counties and villages
are explicitly given authority.78 Under two statutes towns may assume
the powers of villages, making their authority derivative.79 The authority
for cities to tax property is tersely conferred in a list of the means that
the common council may employ to perform its general duties.80 Voca-
tional, Technical and Adult Education Districts have clear authority.8 I
There are four grants of authority to school districts: one to the Milwau-
kee School District, authorizing it to require the City of Milwaukee to
levy for the district,8 one to the annual meeting of common or union
high school districts, 3 one to the boards of common or union high
school districts,' and one to the boards of unified districts.8 5 Three
types of special districts have property tax authority. They include pub-
lic inland lake protection and rehabilitation districts (which actually are
72. Id. § 66.75(1).
73. I& § 77.70.
74. Id. § 341.35(1).
75. I& § 66.75(1).
76. Id. § 77.98.
77. Id. § 77.99.
78. Id. §§ 59.07(5), 61.46.
79. Id. §§ 60.10(2)(c), 60.22(3).
80. id. § 62.11(5).
81. Id. § 38.16.
82. Id. §§ 119.46-.48.
83. Id. § 120.10(6)-(10).
84. Id. § 120.12(3).
85. Id. § 120.44(1).
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required to impose a property tax),86 metropolitan sewerage districts,'
and the Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage District.88 There are also
specific property tax authorizations that apply only to forest land.89
IV. LIMrrATIONS ON THE POWER TO TAx
As shown above, the state's power to tax and authorize local units of
government to tax is not quite plenary. Certain limits, some of them
constitutional and some firmly established in case law, apply. One of
those limits is the principle that the unit of government that imposes a
tax must also be the unit of government that spends the tax proceeds. It
might be argued that this principle does not exist, given two cases in
which challenges to "impact fees" were unsuccessful.9" Prior to the en-
actment of a law to prevent the practice, 91 a few municipalities had been
charging impact fees to developers and giving some of the proceeds to
school districts. (These "fees" are actually taxes because the revenue
that they generate is not dedicated to regulatory purposes.) However,
the above principle was not an issue in either case; if it had been, the
impact fees almost certainly would have been invalidated.
This result would have occurred because the courts in five cases prior
to the two impact fee cases ruled that the taxing and spending units of
government must be identical. The court made the same ruling in three
cases that were litigated after the impact fee cases. The earliest case was
litigated in 186592 and was followed by two early twentieth-century
cases.93 In the fourth case, the court set forth a clear statement of the
rule: "[A] tax must be spent at the level at which it is raised."94 Two
years later, the court reiterated the principle. 95 The doctrine remained
viable thirty-five years later.96 When next addressing this principle, the
court acknowledged its long history and connected it to the public pur-
86. Id. § 33.31(3).
87. Id. § 66.25(2).
88. Id. § 66.91(6).
89. Id. §§ 77.01-77.17, 77.84.
90. Black v. City of Waukesha, 125 Wis. 2d 254, 371 N.W.2d 389 (Ct. App. 1985); Jordan
v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 442 (1965).
91. 1993 Wis. Laws 305(1)-(2).
92. Brodhead v. City of Milwaukee, 19 Wis. 658 (1865).
93. State ex rel. New Richmond v. Davidson, 114 Wis. 563, 576, 88 N.W. 596, 596 (1902);
State ex reL Owen v. Donald, 160 Vis. 21, 125, 151 N.W. 331, 365 (1915).
94. State ex rel. Wisconsin Dev. Auth. v. Dammann, 228 Wis. 147, 183,280 N.W. 698,709
(1938).
95. State ex reL American Legion 1941 Cony. Corp. v. Smith, 235 Wis. 443,451,293 N.W.
161, 166 (1940).
96. State ex rel. Warren v. Nusbaum, 59 Wis. 2d 391, 421, 208 N.W.2d 780, 799 (1973).
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pose doctrine: "Wisconsin has long recognized this rule of constitutional
interpretation, i.e., the purpose of the tax must be one which pertains to
the public purpose of the district within which the tax is to be levied and
raised."97 The court most recently affirmed this rule in 1980.98
This principle does not mean that one unit of government may not
collect tax revenue, commingle it with other funds, and then make pay-
ments to other units of government. The state annually distributes bil-
lions of dollars in aid to other units of government. Because money is
fungible and thus cannot be traced, it cannot plausibly be argued that aid
programs violate the principle that the taxing unit and the spending unit
must be identical. Nevertheless, a municipal ordinance imposing a tax or
fee and specifying that part or all of its proceeds shall be given to an-
other unit of government would violate this principle, as would a state
statute authorizing a municipality to do so.
The next limit on the taxing authority of governmental units in Wis-
consin follows from the limit just delineated. If a unit of government
imposing a tax must be the unit of government spending the tax pro-
ceeds, one can conclude that only a unit of government may tax. Other-
wise, the rule would be stated more broadly; for example, the rule could
refer to taxing authorities rather than units of government. Common
sense would also suggest that taxation is a function peculiar to units of
government. These two rather slender reeds are reinforced by a number
of cases which hold that only units of government may impose taxes.
The roots of this doctrine lie in the opening statement of Cooley on
Taxation, as quoted in a Wisconsin case: A tax is "levied by the state by
virtue of its sovereignty for support of government and for all public
needs."99 A later case makes it clear that "state" was intended as a ge-
neric term for a unit of government. The court, citing the passage from
the earlier case, held that a charge was not a tax because it was "not
imposed by the city in the exercise of its sovereign power."'" In another
case, the court arrived at the same destination by following a different
route, stating that "[a]ny payment exacted by the state or its municipal
subdivisions as a contribution toward the cost of maintaining govern-
97. Buse v. Smith, 74 Wis. 2d 550, 577, 247 N.W.2d 141, 153 (1976).
98. Sigma Tau Gamma Fraternity House v. City of Menomonie, 93 Wis. 2d 392, 412-13,
288 N.W.2d 85, 94 (1980).
99. Fitch v. Wisconsin Tax Comm'n, 201 Wis. 383, 387, 230 N.W. 37, 38 (1930).
100. City of De Pere v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 266 Wis. 319, 325, 63 N.W.2d 764, 768
(1954).
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mental functions... is a tax."''1 1 Subsequently, this holding was cited by
the court when it declared that "[a] tax is an exaction, usually of money,
by the government for the support of government."'" Later, in yet an-
other case, the court stated the rule, by then firmly established, in
slightly different terms: A tax is "levied by the state or municipality for
the support of its government and its public needs.' 0 3 Two years later
the court approvingly quoted the earlier version of the rule. °4 The most
recent statement of the rule also quoted the earlier version. 5
In order to apply the rule that only units of government may tax, it is
necessary to define "unit of government." Unfortunately, the seven
cases that enunciate the rule do not define the term. Nor is the term
defined in other tax cases. One logical reaction to this vacuum is to pro-
ceed inductively. Common sense suggests that the state, counties, cities,
villages, and towns are units of government. An attempt to devise a def-
inition by identifying the attributes that these entities share would per-
haps result in a statement such as "a unit of government is an entity that
performs a wide variety of functions for the general public in its jurisdic-
tion and that has elected officials." Difficulty with this definition soon
arises.
The two next most obvious candidates for the status of unit of gov-
ernment are school districts and vocational, technical, and adult educa-
tion districts. The first difficulty with the definition above is that these
districts with taxing authority perform narrow functions for the public
within their jurisdictions. A second difficulty is that the elected officials
test eliminates vocational, technical and adult education districts and the
special districts that have taxing authority, because all of these entities
have appointed - not elected - officials. It also casts some doubt on the
inclusion of certain school districts, since the annual meetings of com-
mon and union high school districts have taxing authority.
However, one can resolve these difficulties by asking not "what is a
unit of government?" but "what is not a unit of government?" If the
latter question can be answered, the principle that only units of govern-
ment may tax can be applied, and one can determine at least some of the
entities that may not tax. Although identifying every entity that is not a
101. City of Milwaukee v. Milwaukee Suburban Transp. Corp., 6 Wis. 2d 299, 304, 94
N.W.2d 584, 588 (1959) (quoting 51 AM. JUR. § 3 Taxation (1944)).
102. State ex rel. Bldg. Owners & Managers Ass'n v. Adamany, 64 Wis. 2d 280, 289, 219
N.W. 274, 279 (1974).
103. Buse v. Smith, 74 Wis. 2d 550, 575, 247 N.W.2d 141, 153 (1976).
104. State ex reL La Follette v. Torphy, 85 Wis. 2d 94, 108, 270 N.W.2d 187, 192 (1978).
105. O'Donnell v. Reivitz, 144 Wis. 2d 717, 725, 424 N.W.2d 733, 735 (Ct. App. 1988).
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unit of government is impossible, many entities employ the strategy of
avoiding classification as a unit of government in order to avoid constitu-
tional limitations. Surely those entities cannot argue both that constitu-
tional limitations do not apply to them because they are not units of
government and that they have taxing authority because they are units
of government.
The entities that have worked themselves into this comer are a
number of authorities and similar entities created by statute which have
labels that make them look like units of government. Examples include
industrial development agencies ("public instrumentality and body cor-
porate and politic"), 10 6 county housing authorities (no label is given, but
because statutes that apply to city housing authorities also apply to
county housing authorities, each is a "public body corporate and poli-
tic"), 0 7 regional transportation authority (not labeled), 08 veterans'
housing authorities ("public body corporate and politic"),10 9 housing au-
thorities for elderly persons ("public body corporate and politic"),"10 city
housing authorities ("public body corporate and politic")," redevelop-
ment authorities ("body corporate and politic"), 1 2 housing and commu-
nity development authorities ("body politic"),"13 metropolitan transit
authorities ("political subdivision, body politic and corporate")," 4 the
Health and Educational Facilities Authority ("public body politic and
corporate")," 5 the Bradley Center Sports and Entertainment Corpora-
tion ("public body corporate and politic"),"16 the Wisconsin Housing and
Economic Development Authority ("public body corporate and poli-
tic"),"17 and the World Dairy Center Authority ("public body corporate
and politic")." None of these entities has statutory taxing authority
and probably none, despite the statutory descriptions of their nature,
could constitutionally be given taxing authority.
106. Wis. STAT. § 59.071(4)(d) (1991-92).
107. Id. § 59.075.
108. Id. § 59.966.
109. Id. § 66.39(2).
110. Id. § 66.395(4)(a).
111. Id. § 66.40(4)(a).
112. Id. § 66.431.
113. ML § 66.4325.
114. Id. § 66.94(2).
115. Id. § 231.02(1).
116. Id. § 232.03(1).
117. Id. § 234.02(1).
118. Id. § 235.02(1).
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A case about the Housing Finance Authority illustrates the machina-
tions involved in avoiding constitutional prohibitions by avoiding being
labeled a unit of government." 9 In the case, the court held that the
Housing Finance Authority (predecessor to the Wisconsin Housing and
Economic Development Authority) had been put together in such a way
as to prevent it from being subject to the constitutional debt limits, the
prohibition against pledging the credit of the state, and the prohibition
against constructing internal improvements. 2 ° That is, the court held
that the authority was not a unit of government and was not part of the
state. In another case, the court held that a local entity that was akin to
an authority, an industrial development agency, was not subject to the
constitutional limit on municipal debt12' because it was not a
municipality.'22
Two important determinations must be made in accordance with the
rule that only units of government may tax. First, the extent to which
non-governmental bodies may participate in imposing taxes for govern-
mental units must be determined, and second, it must be determined
whether the legislature has delegated legislative authority to tax contrary
to the state constitution.'" In an early case, the court addressed these
issues by distinguishing between two meanings of "levy a tax.' 24 One
meaning refers to the determination of the amount of revenue to be
raised and the vote to impose the tax, while the other meaning refers to
the carrying out of mere ministerial duties in regard to a tax."z The
court held that the State Board of Assessors, which was not a govern-
mental unit, exercised only ministerial duties when it assessed railroad
property and applied the statewide average property tax rate to the as-
sessed value. 26 Since the tax was previously approved by the legislature,
it was imposed by the state and was valid. However, in a later case in-
volving non-governmental officials and taxation, the court invalidated a
tax.' 27 At issue was a statute that allowed a group of freeholders, under
certain circumstances, to force a town board to levy a tax for highways.
The court held that "the tax power must be exerted by the legislative
119. State ex rel. Warren v. Nusbaum, 59 Wis. 2d 391, 208 N.W.2d 780 (1973).
120. WIs. CONST. art. VIII, §§ 4, 6, 7; art. VIII, § 3; art. VIII, § 10.
121. Id. art. XI, § 3.
122. State ex reL Bowman v. Barczak, 34 Wis. 2d 57, 148 N.W.2d 683 (1967).
123. WIs. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
124. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co. v. State, 128 Wis. 553, 629, 108 N.W. 557, 576
(1906).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 631, 108 N.W. at 576.
127. State ex rel. Carey v. Ballard, 158 Wis. 251, 148 N.W. 1090 (1914).
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branch of government either directly or through the officers of a political
subdivision."' 2 At this point, it seemed that non-governmental officials
could not impose a tax, but could only perform ministerial duties neces-
sary for its imposition.
The next time the court considered the issue of the status necessary
to impose taxes, it found an unusual way to validate the property taxes
imposed by the Metropolitan Sewerage Commission of Milwaukee. 2 9
The sewerage commissioners had authority to tell the county board the
amount of revenue the commission needed. The board was then re-
quired to issue bonds in an amount necessary to provide the needed rev-
enue and to impose a tax to retire the bonds. It appeared that the
commission, through its agent, the county, imposed the tax. It certainly
determined the amount of revenue needed, which was not a mere minis-
terial duty. The court, rather than simply holding that the commission
was a governmental body, unnecessarily adopted the reasoning of the
court in the previous case and held that "[t]he taxing power of the state
is exerted through the Metropolitan Sewerage Commission and the vari-
ous governing bodies and officers of the various municipalities.' 30 The
argument is sophistry because the state merely authorized the imposition
of the tax, and the sewerage district, by means of the county, actually
imposed the tax.
In a subsequent case, the court returned to the ministerial duties ar-
gument. That case involved the Green Bay Sewerage District, which,
unlike the Milwaukee district, had the authority to impose a tax itself
rather than the mere authority to require a county to impose a tax. 31
The court improbably found that the district's determination of its reve-
nue needs and its other actions were ministerial' 32 and that the tax was
actually imposed not by the district, but by the legislature. 33 A few
years later the court reached the same result for the same reasons.3
Finally, the court validated a tax imposed by a vocational, technical, and
adult education district, holding that the legislature had delegated its
128. IL at 258, 148 N.W. at 1092.
129. Thielen v. Metropolitan Sewerage Comm'n, 178 Wis. 34, 189 N.W. 484 (1922).
130. I& at 54, 189 N.W. at 492.
131. Golden v. Green Bay Metro. Sewerage Dist., 210 Wis. 193, 201, 246 N.W. 505, 508
(1933).
132. Id. at 202, 246 N.W. at 509.
133. Id. at 203, 246 N.W. at 509.
134. State ex reL Milwaukee Sewerage Conm'n v. Board of Supervisors, 220 Wis. 670,
675, 265 N.W. 848, 850 (1936).
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taxing authority to the district and that such a delegation was
constitutional. 35
In addition to granting taxing authority, the section of the constitu-
tion containing the uniformity clause limits taxing authority. 36 The most
significant limit is the requirement of uniformity, which has been elabo-
rated on in more than 125 appellate cases and applies only to the prop-
erty tax. A recent article exhaustively covers that subject. 137
This section of the state constitution also requires that the exemp-
tions for taxes on incomes, privileges, and occupations be "reasonable."
The reasonableness requirement was litigated in a case involving the
Housing Finance Authority. The court found that an income tax exemp-
tion for the earnings from the authority's notes and bonds was reason-
able, defined as having "a reasonable relation to a legitimate end of
governmental action.' 1 38 The reasonableness requirement has probably
been litigated so rarely because reasonableness is far from a demanding
standard.
Oddly enough, the meaning of "income" in that section of the consti-
tution has frequently been litigated in cases in which taxpayers have ar-
gued that the income tax was improperly applied to them. They argued
that "income" is a limiting term. In most cases the subject was earnings
on intangible property. The usual argument was that part of the earn-
ings were a return of capital, not "income." The first two cases involved
earnings on bonds. In each case, the court held that "income" meant the
"fruits of property and labor.' 1 39 The next three cases on this issue in-
volved dividends. In each of the three the court defined "income" as
"profit or gain.' 140 The taxpayers lost all of the cases because the court
defined income so broadly. In the next case, however, the court cited
the "profit or gain" definition and held that revenue from the sale of
tobacco was not entirely profit or gain because the seller should be al-
lowed to deduct the cost of producing the tobacco when computing the
135. Village of West Milwaukee v. Area Bd. of Vocational, Tech. & Adult Educ., 51 Wis.
2d 356, 369, 187 N.W.2d 387, 392 (1971).
136. WIs. CONST. art. VIII, § 1.
137. Jack Stark, The Uniformity Clause Of The State Constitution, 76 MARO. L. REv. 577
(1993).
138. State ex rel. Warren v. Nusbaum, 59 Wis. 2d 391, 438, 208 N.W.2d 780, 808 (1973).
139. State ex rel. Manitowoc Gas Co. v. Wisconsin Tax Comm'n, 161 Wis. 111, 116, 152
N.W. 848, 850 (1915); Van Dyke v. City of Milwaukee, 159 Wis. 460, 464, 146 N.W. 812, 814
(1915).
140. State ex rel. Moon v. Nygaard, 170 Wis. 415, 418, 175 N.W. 810, 811 (1920); State ex
rel. Wisconsin Trust Co. v. Widule, 164 Wis. 56, 61, 159 N.W. 630, 632 (1916); State ex rel.
Bundy v. Nygaard, 163 Wis. 307, 310, 158 N.W. 87, 88 (1916).
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tax on that revenue. 141 In another dividends case, the court ignored the
earlier, more precise definition of "income" and announced that it would
give the term a meaning liberal enough to include dividends.'4 In five
later cases, which involved potential earnings on secured contracts,' 43 a
loss on stock, 44 a gain on stock, 45 a gain on the transfer of real estate in
a divorce, 46 and a gain on a stock option,147 the court went back to the
"profit or gain" definition. In short, although it has been established
that the income tax may be imposed only on "income," the prevailing
definition of "income" is so broad that the standard is easily met.
V. CONCLUSION
The points about taxing authority and its limits presented above are
the major ones that legislators and local officials who wish to create or
modify a tax need to consider. Some of them are far from obvious and
can be found only by carefully examining Wisconsin case law. Their im-
portance bears reiteration. To venture beyond one's taxing authority is
to court disaster.
141. Village of Westby v. Bekkedal, 172 Wis. 114, 119, 178 N.W. 451, 453 (1920).
142. State ex reL Dulaney v. Nygaard, 174 Wis. 597, 608, 183 N.W. 884, 887-88 (1921).
143. State ex rel. Waldheim v. Wisconsin Tax Comm'n, 187 Wis. 539, 544, 204 N.W. 481,
482 (1925).
144. Falk v. Wisconsin Tax Comm'n, 201 Ws. 292, 294, 230 N.W. 64, 64 (1930).
145. Appeal of Siesel, 217 Wis. 661, 665, 259 N.W. 839, 841 (1935).
146. Department of Taxation v. Siegman, 24 Wis. 2d 92, 96, 128 N.W.2d 658, 661 (1964).
147. Uecke v. Department of Taxation, 36 Wis. 2d 530, 535, 153 N.W.2d 614, 617 (1967).
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